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Abstract: There are both believers and critics on the state and potential of Sino-African trade. 
For example, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is expected to benefit several African 
countries. At the same time, some critics refer to it as ‘debt trap diplomacy’ for China to 
politically and economically exploit the countries involved. Nearly a decade ago, China 
surpassed the US to become Africa’s largest trading partner. Sino-African trade is now four 
times larger than that of US-Africa. While the importance of Sino-African trade can be seen in 
the scale of trade and investment, this article at the same time concerns the legal, and also some 
non-legal mechanisms such as BRI and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, to take the 
bilateral/multilateral relations to the next level. Other than continental and country level 
perspectives, firm level considerations cannot be ignored. Chinese companies now dominate 
in certain Africa’s business sectors and are rapidly expanding into new sectors. There have 
been concerns regarding the behaviour of certain Chinese companies in Africa. Through a 
multi-level analysis, the article endeavours to form a comprehensive picture of the closer than 
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Introduction 
Nearly a decade ago, China surpassed the US to become Africa’s largest trading partner.1 In 
2017, Sino-African trade was four times larger than that of US-Africa.2 While the importance 
of Sino-African trade can be seen in the scale of trade and investment, this article at the same 
time concerns the legal, and also some non-legal mechanisms such as China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), to take the 
bilateral/multilateral relations to the next level. The legal mechanisms include the bilateral (and 
can also be multilateral) trade and investment treaties signed between China and African 
countries. New development in this regard has been the signing of a free trade agreement (FTA) 
between China and Mauritius on 17 October 2019, the first ever Chinese FTA with an African 
country, as well as the launch of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), enabling 
negotiations with Africa as a bloc.3 As for the non-legal mechanisms, the BRI refers to the Silk 
Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, involving numerious 
infrastructure projects linking the continents; whereas the FOCAC is a platform established by 
China and African countries for collective consultation and dialogue and a cooperation 
mechanism between the countries.4 Through a multi-level analysis, the article endeavours to 
form a comprehensive picture of the closer than ever Sino-African trade relations. This article 
is divided into two main parts and is structured as follows: in the first part, the paper will discuss 
China’s trade with Africa as a continent as a whole (continental-level evidence). It will look at 
the trade volume between both sides and the level of investments from China in Africa, and 
explore the scope for China to foster a closer relationship with Africa. The second and third 
parts will proceed to discuss China’s trade with certain selected African countries and Chinese 
companies in Africa (country-level and firm-level evidence) before a conclusion is made.  
Continental-level Evidence 
According to data from the China Africa Research Initiative5, the value of China-Africa trade 
in 2018 was US$204 billion, up from US$155 billion in 2017.6 China-Africa bilateral trade has 
been steadily increasing over the past two decades, despite weak commodity prices since 2014 
have greatly impacted trade activities. For the trade figures since 1998, see Chart 1. It can be 
seen that when comparing the figures in 1998 and 2018, there was an over fifty-fold increase 
in trade value from US$3.91 billion to US$204 billion. In most of the years, China generally 
																																								 																				
1 Luke Patey, ‘The Chinese Model is Failing Africa’ Financial Times (26 August 2018) 
https://www.ft.com/content/ca4072f6-a79f-11e8-a1b6-f368d365bf0e accessed 10 March 2020. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Mu Xuequan, ‘China, Mauritius Sign Free Trade Agreement’ XinhuaNet (17 October 2019) 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-10/17/c_138480183.htm accessed 10 March 2020; for more about the 
AfCFTA, see African Union, ‘About AfCFTA’ (2020) https://au.int/en/cfta accessed 10 March 2020. 
4 For more about BRI, refer to official portal, Office of the Leading Group for the Belt and Road Initiative, ‘Belt 
and Road Portal’ (2020) https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ accessed 10 March 2020. For more about FOCAC, see 
Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Committee of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, ‘Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation’ (2020) https://www.focac.org/eng/ accessed 10 March 2020. 
5 Covering 54 countries, as defined by the UN. In contrast, the African Union (AU), as a continental body 
consists of 55 member states. The additional member state in the AU is Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, 
also known as the Western Sahara. The China Africa Research Initiative provides and consolidates data as 
reported by the Chinese government. The Initiative, launched in 2014, is based at the Johns Hopkins University 
School of Advanced International Studies in Washington D.C., with the aim to promote evidence-based 
understanding of the relations between China and African countries. See China Africa Research Initiative, 
‘Other China-Africa Data’ (2020) http://www.sais-cari.org/other-data accessed 10 March 2020. 
6. The trade value is the sum of China’s imports from Africa and China’s exports to the continent.  
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exported more to Africa than it imported from the continent, with exceptions that in some years 
when the two values were roughly equal or even the latter slightly exceeded the former.7  
Chart 1 - China-Africa Bilateral Trade Volume 1998-2018 (US$ bn) 
 
Data Source: China Africa Research Initiative 
   The African Trade Statistics Yearbook indicated that the whole of the African Union (AU) 
accounted for approximately 3 percent of the world’s trade in goods in 2016.8 The three major 
African importers (Egypt, South Africa and Algeria) and three major exporters (South Africa, 
Nigeria and Angola) accounted together for 39 percent of total AU imports and exports. Among 
countries, the main net exporters were Angola (ratio 265 percent), Gabon (ratio 162 percent), 
Côte d’Ivoire (ratio 127 percent), and Botswana (ratio 121 percent). Trading with China, as 
well as other overseas countries, is crucial because the African Trade Statistics Yearbook also 
reported that extra African trade made up more than 80 percent of the total trade, with the 
remaining being intra African trade.9 China remained by far the most important AU trading 
partner accounting in 2016 for 13 percent of extra-AU exports10 and 17 percent of extra-AU 
imports11. Conversely, as a comparison, the value of China-Africa trade merely accounted for 
4.4 percent of the total volume of Chinese trade with the world, notably less than that with 
other key trading partners.12  
																																								 																				
7 For example, in years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2011, there was largely balanced trade between China 
and Africa.  
8 African Union, ‘African Trade Statistics Yearbook 2017’ (2018) 
https://au.int/en/documents/20180917/african-trade-statistics-yearbook-2017 accessed 10 March 2020. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 16. As a comparison, the largest destination markets for AU goods, after China, were India and the US, 
accounting for 7 percent of extra African exports each, followed by France, Spain and Italy (6 percent each). 
11 Ibid. As a comparison, the value of goods imported from France, Germany and United States made up 
approximately 6 percent for each. 
12 China’s total trade volume (imports and exports) with the world in 2018 amounted to US$4,623 billion, with 
the value of China-Africa trade at US$204 billion as stated before. As a further comparison, China’s trade 
volume with the EU, the US, and ASEAN amounted to US$682 (14.8 percent), US$634 (13.7 percent), and 



















































   In addition to imports and exports, another important indicator of trade is the level of 
investment. Although naturally there is an opposite flow from Africa to China, the article is 
more concerned with the Chinese FDI flows to Africa. In Table 1, it can be seen that the 
Chinese FDI stock in Africa from 2008 to 2017, relative to overall Chinese FDI stock in the 
whole world. China’s direct investment in Africa has been steadily increasing for the past 
decade. Meanwhile, it can be seen that China’s FDI stock in Africa amounted to 4.24 percent 
of their total overseas FDI stock in 2008, dropping to 2.39 percent in 2017, indicating a trend 
that Chinese investors have been becoming more interested in other parts of the world instead 
of Africa. Furthermore, it is worth highlighting that, as reported by Ernst & Young, the US 
remains Africa’s largest source of FDI, with European countries close behind.13 To interpret 
the findings from Ernst & Young, Adegoke and Matiashe believe that the US and EU have 
undertaken an approach different from China’s predominantly loan-based infrastructure focus 
(therefore not being counted as ‘investments’), where the latter inevitably warrants public 
concern concern in light of the debt incurred by African governments.14 A way to address this 
problem will be for China to move toward a blended financing model, involving a mix of 
lending and taking equity stakes in the infrastructure projects.15  
Table 1 - Chinese FDI Stock in Africa and the World (US$ bn) 2008-2017 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Africa* 7.80 9.33 13.04 16.24 21.73 26.19 32.35 34.69 39.88 43.30 




4.24 3.79 4.11 3.82 4.08 3.96 3.67 3.16 2.94 2.39 
Data Source: China Africa Research Initiative  
*Note: The African figures here do not include Somalia, Swaziland and Western Sahara.  
   Having had a quick overview of some figures, the next step is to look at the mechanisms, 
both legal and non-legal, which can foster the bilateral trade. One option is to trade on WTO 
terms. China has been a member of WTO since 11 December 2001. In contrast, not all African 
countries are members of the WTO. Non-WTO members include Algeria, Ethiopia, Equatorial 
Guinea, Comoros, Libya, São Tomé and Príncipe, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan.16 
   Despite the fact that non-discrimination17 among trading partners is one of the core principles 
of the WTO, regional trade agreements (RTAs), which are defined as reciprocal preferential 
																																								 																				
13 Ernst & Young, ‘Turning Tides’ (2018) https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-Africa-
Attractiveness-2018/$FILE/ey-Africa-Attractiveness-2018.pdf accessed 10 March 2020. Ernst & Young 
attributed this to the US African Growth and Opportunity Act.  
14 Yinka Adegoke & Farai Shawn Matiashe, ‘US Corporates Made More Investments in Africa in 2017 than 
Businesses from Any Other Country’ Quartz  (6 November 2018) https://qz.com/africa/1451768/us-still-leads-
china-in-fdi-investments-in-africa accessed 10 March 2020. For a comparative view between the stakes of 
China, US and EU in Africa, see Witney Schneidman and Joel Wiegert, ‘Competing in Africa: China, the 
European Union, and the United States’ (2018) https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-
focus/2018/04/16/competing-in-africa-china-the-european-union-and-the-united-states/ accessed 10 March 
2020. See also in this article below for some critqiues on the BRI, which is infrastructure project-based as 
opposed to treaties-based. 
15 Schneidman and Wiegert (2018), supra note 14. 
16 All of them are negotiating accession at the moment. See WTO, ‘WTO Accessions’ (2019) 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acc_e.htm accesssed 10 March 2020. 
17 GATT Art I and GATS Art II for the most-favoured-nation treatment requirement. 
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trade agreements between two or more partners, constitute one of the exemptions and are 
authorised by the WTO.18 According to Carrère, RTAs have generated a significant increase in 
trade between members, but often at the expense of the rest of the world.19 Similarly, Bartels 
and Ortino concur that, on the one hand, RTAs ‘provide countries with an opportunity for 
broader and deeper integration than is otherwise possible, with all attendant political and 
economic benefits’.20 On the other hand, RTAs can also be ‘politically and economically 
risky’.21 In relation to the political risks, the rise of new regional trade blocs can disturb the 
interests of existing stakeholders, namely ‘the founders of the [pre-existing] multilateral trading 
system’.22 In relation to the economic risks, Bartels and Ortino observe that the rise of RTAs 
may not be economically justified.23 Despite these concerns, the WTO observes that RTAs 
‘have risen in number and reach over the years’.24 In the view of de Melo and Tsikata, the 
RTAs increase trade among members via three channels.25  The first is a  reduction in tariffs 
between members;  the second is a  reduction in non-tariff barriers; and the third,  via more 
trade facilitation26. However, in any case, consistent with the data above on intra and extra 
African trade, amongst the main RTAs in Africa, intra-regional imports represent less than 10 
percent of total regional imports.27 
   The RTAs in Africa can be both extra and intra African. Egypt is the most active African 
country to enter into RTAs. The country has reported nine RTAs to the WTO.28 It has bilateral 
trade agreements with the European Free Trade Association, EU29, Turkey, and Southern 
Common Market. It is also part of the Pan-Arab Free Trade Area, Agadir Agreement, and 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Tunisia has similar bilateral 
agreements (reporting seven RTAs) compared to Egypt, except none with Southern Common 
Market and it did not notify the WTO about its membership with COMESA. In the context of 
this article, it is worth highlighting that China has had no bilateral trade agreements with 
anyone of the African countries or trading blocs for a long period of time. This calls into the 
																																								 																				
18 GATT Art XXIV and GATS Art V. 
19 Cèline Carrère, ‘Revisiting the Effects of Regional Trade Agreements on Trade Flows with Proper 
Specification of the Gravity Model’, European Economic Review, 2006, 50(2): 223-247. 
20 Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino, Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), p. 2. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid.  
24 WTO, ‘Regional Trade Agreements’ (2020) 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm#facts accessed 10 March 2020. As of 17 January 
2020, 303 RTAs were in force. Amongst which, there are plenty of intra African RTAs, such as Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU); Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD); Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA); East African Community (EAC); Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD); Southern African Development Community (SADC), etc. 
25 Jaime de Melo and Yvonne Tsikata, ‘Regional integration in Africa : Challenges and prospects’ in Célestin 
Monga and Justin Yifu Lin (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics: Volume 2: Policies and 
Practices (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
26 This includes the installation of tangible infrastructure such as ports, roads, highways and 
telecommunications; and more intangible institutional improvements in transparency, customs management and 
business environment. 
27 de Melo and Tsikata (2015), supra note 25. 
28 Data from the WTO RTA Database. 
29 As a side note, the EU has bilateral agreements with ten African countries or trading blocs, including Algeria, 
Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Eastern and Southern Africa States Interim EPA, Egypt, Ghana, Morocco, Southern 
African Development Community, South Africa, and Tunisia.  
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question the ‘adequacy of the legal infrastructure for the ordering of economic relations 
between China and Africa’.30 A recent breakthrough came on 17 October 2019, when the FTA 
between China and Mauritius was signed.31 According to the Ministry of Commerce of China, 
in addition to closer bilateral relations, the FTA also has a ‘continental level’ meaning by 
fostering China-Africa comprehensive strategic partnership, and ‘[elevating] China-Africa 
economic and trade cooperation to a new height’.32  
   According to the WTO, China currently has 15 RTAs in force.33 There is scope for China to 
enter into RTAs with more African countries, or trading blocs to foster more trade. But it is 
worth noting that China has offered unilateral duty free treatment to 41 least developed 
countries, most in Africa.34 Comparatively, China may have done notably more to foster 
investment in Africa.  The principal legal instruments that govern China-Africa investment 
relations are bilateral investment treaties (BITs). So far, China has signed BITs with 35 African 
countries.35 BIT is an agreement between two countries regarding the promotion and protection 
of investments made by investors from respective countries in each other's territory.36 The three 
goals of BITs are foreign investment protection, market liberalisation, and foreign investment 
promotion.37 In the view of Salacuse and Sullivan, while BITs may not have directly and 
substantially liberalised FDI, there is strong evidence to show that they both protect and 
promote FDI in developing countries.38  As observed by Ofodile, ‘BITs appear to play a 
minimal role in stimulating FDI inflow.’39 This may explain why the level of Chinese FDI in 
Africa still remains low (especially when compared to the US and EU) despite the existence of 
various BITs. In a similar vein, the lack of FTAs (though now there is one with Mauritius) has 
																																								 																				
30 Won Kidane, ‘China’s Bilateral Investment Treaties with African States in Comparative Context’, Cornell 
International Law Journal, 2016, 49: 141-177, p. 142. 
31 Ministry of Commerce of China, ‘China and Mauritius Sign Free Trade Agreement’ (2019), 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/chinamauritiusen/enmauritius/201910/41658_1.html accessed 10 March 
2020. 
32 Ibid. 
33 They are with: ASEAN, Asia Pacific Trade Agreement, Australia, Chile, Costa Rica, Georgia, Hong Kong, 
South Korea, Macau, New Zealand, Singapore, Iceland, Pakistan, Peru, and Switzerland. But according to the 
Ministry of Commerce of China, the China-Mauritius Free Trade Agreement is the 17th FTA signed by China. 
See ibid. By comparing the two sources, the China-Mauritius FTA and the China-Maldives FTA (signed on 7 
December 2017) are currently missing from the WTO database. 
34 Data from the WTO Preferential Trade Arrangements Database. See Duty-free treatment for LDCs – China 
(entered into force 1 Jul 2010). All but nine countries are located in Africa. Indeed, it is not uncommon for 
developed countries to grant either full or nearly full duty-free, quota-free market access to LDCs under similar 
arrangement. However, it is worth noting that China is still a developing country. Under the WTO, there are no 
definitions of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries. Members announce for themselves whether they are 
‘developed’ or ‘developing’ countries. In light of the fact that China is now the second largest economy in the 
world, only behind the US, US President Donald Trump has recently put pressure on the WTO to change how it 
designates developing countries, singling out China for its ‘developing’ status. See Jeff Mason and David 
Lawder, ‘Trump Targets China in Call for WTO to Reform 'Developing' Country Status’ Reuters (26 July 2019) 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-wto/trump-targets-china-in-call-for-wto-to-reform-developing-
country-status-idUSKCN1UL2G6 accessed 10 March 2020. 
35 China is a party to 145 BITs. Data from the UNCTAD Database. 
36 UNCTAD, ‘International Investment Agreements Navigator’ (2020) 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements accessed 10 March 2020. 
37 Jeswald Salacuse and Nicholas Sullivan, ‘Do BITs Really Work: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Their Grand Bargain’, Harvard International Law Journal, 2005, 46(1): 67-130, p. 111. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, ‘Africa-China Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Critique’, Michigan Journal of 
International Law, 2013, 35(1): 131-211, p. 203. 
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not prevented China from becoming the largest trading partner with Africa. The actual effect 
of these treaties and agreements on trade and investments is arguably more apparent than real. 
   More generally, according to the Chinese government, China-Africa economic and trade 
cooperation has been developed within the framework of the FOCAC.40 The Forum has 53 
African members. 41  It is a platform established by China in collaboration with African 
countries for collective consultation and dialogue. Established in 2000, FOCAC ministerial 
summits take place every three years, alternatively in China and then Africa. The existence of 
FOCAC might be best seen as the institutionalisation of Sino-African relations at a time of 
intensified interactions and following a period of exponential growth in such linkages.42 In the 
view of Taylor, from the African perspective, new aid commitments from China can help 
solidify the African leaders’ positions of authority back home. 43  But from the Chinese 
perspective, the need for FOCAC is not necessarily clear. Du Plessis is by contrast more 
adamant about the role of FOCAC, and claims that it embodies China and Africa’s ‘strategic 
partnership’.44 The partnership entails deepening and diversifying relations, involving several 
role players from both China and Africa. Local, provincial and national governments, 
multinational companies, individuals, entrepreneurs and workers are all propelled onto the 
global stage and function under the framework of  FOCAC. 
   Furthermore, Sino-African relations can be understood in terms of China’s BRI. When the 
Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Central Asia and Southeast Asia in Autumn 2013, he 
raised the initiative of jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road (and hence the name, Belt and Road). According to the State Council of 
China, BRI can help promote the economic prosperity of the countries along the routes and 
regional economic cooperation, strengthen exchanges and mutual learning between different 
civilisations, and promote world peace and development. 45  Tang provides a thoughtful 
comparison between bilateral/multilateral trade and investment agreements and BRI.46 BRI is 
based upon projects, not rules. Bilateral/multilateral trade and investment agreements normally 
lead to standards beyond those set by the WTO, such as further cuts in tariffs and better 
treatment of foreign investors. Meanwhile, under BRI, China has made connectivity and 
infrastructure as the top priorities. Many projects such as rail links have been arranged through 
negotiations with other nations and are usually funded with Chinese money. 
 
																																								 																				
40 State Council of China, ‘China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation’ (2013) 
http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474982986536.htm accessed 10 March 2020. 
41 Excluding Swaziland, amongst 54 UN members in Africa. It is the only African country that maintains 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. 
42 Ian Taylor, The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), p. 1. 
43 Ian Taylor, ‘From Santa Claus to Serious Business: Where should FOCAC go next?’, The China Monitor, 
2012, 74: 31-38, p. 38. 
44 Ambrosé Du Plessis, ‘The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, Ideas and Aid: National Interest(s) or 
Strategic Partnership?’, Insight on Africa, 2014, 6(2): 113-130. 
45 National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of 
the People’s Republic of China, ‘Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative’ (2015) 
http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm accessed 10 March 2020. 
46 Frank Tang, ‘How Does China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Match up against the TPP?’, South China Morning 
Post (24 January 2017) https://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2064967/xis-one-belt-one-road-
better-idea-tpp accessed 10 March 2020. 
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   According to the World Bank, an official list of participating countries does not yet exist.47 
To assess the impact of BRI on Africa, one may need to look at the geographical location of a 
country. The Silk Road Economic Belt may not have anything to do with Africa. However, the 
New Maritime Silk Road links China to the nations of South East Asia, the Gulf countries, East 
and North Africa, and on to Europe. Under this definition, the African section of the Maritime 
Road covers three countries: Kenya, Djibouti and Egypt.48 Alternatively, the impact of BRI 
can also be understood in terms of whether a country has signed any BRI collaborative 
agreements with China. Under this definition, there are 125 BRI countries as of March 2019.49 
Many of these countries are not located along the Belt and the Road, such as South Africa and 
Nigeria. According to the Chinese government, the goods trade volume between China and 
these 125 BRI countries surpassed US$6 trillion from 2013 to 2018.50 However, commentators 
are referring to BRI as ‘debt-trap diplomacy’, in a sense that China is trying to exploit poorer 
countries by offering predatory loans for infrastructure development, intending to gain political 
or other concessions in the case of a default. 51   
 
    A noteworthy recent development at the continental level is the launch of the AfCFTA. The 
entry into force of the AfCFTA on 30 May 2019 is described by Amare as ‘an economic, 
political and diplomatic milestone’ for the AU and its member states, as well as ‘making Africa 
a meaningful player in international trade’.52 According to the AU, the AfCFTA can on the one 
hand accelerate intra-African trade; on the other hand, it can also boost Africa’s trading position 
in the global market by strengthening Africa’s common voice and policy space in global trade 
negotiations.53 In the view of Okeke, the AfCFTA as a single trade bloc, will expedite unified 
trade bargains, which are preferred to bespoke negotiation arrangements with countries on an 
individual basis within the continent.54 It may still be too early to assess the impact of the 
AfCFTA on Sino-African trade, but Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang 
regards it as a ‘new ground’ for cooperation between the two sides, in addition to pre-exisitng 




After looking at Africa as a continent, this section will proceed to discuss China’s trade with 
certain African countries, as well as later in the next section the prospects and challenges 
encountered by Chinese companies operating in Africa. From Charts 2 and 3 below, we can 
see China’s trade and investment with the closest African countries. South Africa is China’s 
top partner, both in terms of trade and investment. There is undoubtedly a need to look at China-
																																								 																				
47 World Bank, ‘Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridors’ (2019) 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/publication/belt-and-road-economics-opportunities-
and-risks-of-transport-corridors accessed 10 March 2020. 
48 The World Bank includes Tanzania as a beneficiary country as well. See ibid. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Belt and Road Portal, ‘China's Goods Trade with B&R Countries Reaches over 6 Trln Dollars’ (2019) 
https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/qwyw/rdxw/86301.htm 10 March 2020. 
51 See for example, Nathaniel Taplin, ‘One Belt, One Road, and a Lot of Debt’ Wall Street Journal  (2 May 
2019) https://www.wsj.com/articles/one-belt-one-road-and-a-lot-of-debt-11556789446 accessed 10 March 2020. 
52 Tighisti Amare, ‘The African Continental Free Trade Area Could Boost African Agency in International 
Trade’ (2019) https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/african-continental-free-trade-area-could-boost-
african-agency-international-trade accessed 10 March 2020. 
53 African Union (2020), supra note 3. 
54 Charles Okeke, ‘AfCFTA an Opportunity to Expand China-Africa Ties’ Global Times (11 September 2019) 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1164317.shtml accessed 10 March 2020. 
55 XinhuaNet, ‘China Hails Official Launch of AFCFTA Operational Phase’ (2019) 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2019-07/08/c_138209527.htm accessed 10 March 2020. 
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South Africa trade relations further. Also, Angola is China’s second trading partner and fifth 
investment destination in Africa. China-Angola trade relations will therefore also be discussed. 
Finally, in light of the fact that Kenya and Djibouti are major BRI countries, the two countries 
will also be a focus of this section.  
 
Chart 2 – China’s Top 10 Partners in Africa in 2018 (Trade Volume in US$ bn) 
Data Source: China Africa Research Initiative 
Chart 3 – China’s Top 10 Investment Destination in Africa in 2017 (FDI Stock in US$ 
bn) 
Data Source: China Africa Research Initiative  
   Although South Africa is China’s top trade and investment partner in Africa, the same may 
not be said conversely. In 2017, the EU was the top trading partner of South Africa, with China 
coming the second.56 As a result, it makes sense for South Africa to take a more proactive 
																																								 																				
56 According to the statistics from the WTO, the EU accounted for 21.7 percent and 30.8 of South African 
exports and imports respectively. The corresponding figures with China were 9.8 percent and 18.3 percent 
respectively.  
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stance to deepen trade with the EU. As said above, currently there are no trade agreements 
between China and any African countries, including South Africa. Meanwhile, according to 
the WTO, there are six trade agreements reported by South Africa.57 Firstly, South Africa is a 
member of two trading blocs, namely the Southern African Customs Union and the Southern 
African Development Community. These two trading blocs, in turn, have bilateral trade 
agreements with the European Free Trade Association, EU and Southern Common Market.58	
Moreover, South Africa also has a separate bilateral agreement with the EU and in the process 
of negotiation to sign one with India.59 On the other hand, South Africa has a BIT with China.60 
As noted by Han, the South African government may have adopted a double standard between 
Western countries and China.61 First, non-renewal or abrogation of existing treaties have been 
witnessed with the former, but not the latter or other developing countries. Second, the China-
South Africa treaty seemingly offers a better balance between the interests of investors and 
states. It is observed that the China-South Africa BIT permits investors to enjoy some 
protection and standards of treatment while restricting fair and equitable treatment, including 
the exception of national treatment, thus guaranteeing the policy space of the host state.62 
 
   Although there is no plan for a China-South Africa free trade agreement, the bilateral 
mechanisms to boost the trade between both sides can perhaps be understood in terms of a 
broader picture. On 28 June 2004, Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong visited South Africa 
where the two sides announced the launch of China-SACU63 free trade negotiations.64 As 
indicated before, there are both benefits and risks in the use of RTAs. The potential increased 
exports and inflow of investments can be the obvious benefits. In contrast, South Africa and 
the rest of SACU have legitimate concerns about the impact of a free trade agreement with   
China. As indicated by the South African Institute of Foreign Affairs, the concerns are 
twofold.65  Firstly, that cheap Chinese products will flood the South African market, and 
secondly, that it will at the same time impact intra-African trade in a sense that the Chinese 
goods will replace South African goods being exported to the other SACU member states.  
 
   Here a useful comparison may be drawn between a potential China-SACU agreement and 
the EU-SADC66 Economic Partnership Agreement67. The latter was signed on 10 June 2016. 
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58 Ibid. 
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62 Ibid. p. 274. 
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64 Ministry of Commerce of China, ‘China-SACU FTA’ (2019) http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/ensacu.shtml 
accessed 10 March 2020. 
65 South African Institute of Foreign Affairs, ‘A China-SACU FTA: What’s in it for SA?’ South African 
Foreign Policy Monitor (August/September 2004) https://www.saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/2004_-
FPM_-Aug_Sep.pdf accessed 10 March 2020. 
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Forestry and Fisheries of South Africa, ‘SACU Agreement and SADC Protocol on Trade (2009) 
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f accessed 10 March 2020. 
67 Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union  and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) EPA Group (signed on 10 June 2016). 
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As assessed by the Department of International Trade of the UK, the agreement is 
development-focused in a sense that while it is reciprocal, trade liberalisation is strongly 
asymmetric in favour of the Southern African countries.68 Firstly, the EU will open its market 
more than the SADC states have committed to. It guarantees immediate duty-free quota-free 
access into the EU goods market for Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, and 
Swaziland (when South Africa benefits from duty-free access for 98.7 percent of products).69 
Secondly, the SADC states will benefit from a range of safeguard measures (protections from 
a sudden surge in imports). 70  Thirdly, the EU is committed to substantial development 
assistance to the SADC, for example, in relation to capacity building. 71  This EU-SADC 
agreement will set out a good model for the ongoing China-SACU negotiations. Furthermore, 
China-South Africa’s cooperation can also be understood in terms of the wider BRICS72 
summits. The summits are regarded as dialogue and cooperation platform. Despite also 
covering topics like peace and security, the platform is largely trade and development 
oriented.73	
 
   As commented by South Africa President Cyril Ramaphosa, much of what is exported from 
Africa are raw materials and primary products (though not exactly a South African problem as 
noted below); much of what is imported from China are finished goods.74 Therefore, this limits 
the ability of African countries to extract the full value for their abundant natural resources and 
to create work for their people. The response was an action plan in which Beijing committed 
to increasing China’s imports of non-resource products from African countries, particularly 
value-added agricultural and industrial goods, as announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping 
in the China-Africa Summit 2018.75  
 
   In line with its very rapid economic development, China’s oil consumption doubled to 6.8 
million barrels per day from 1995 to 2005.76 The new figure as of 2018 stood at around 13.5 
million barrels per day.77 To keep up with this rapidly rising demand for petroleum, Beijing 
has been encouraging state-owned oil companies to secure exploration and supply agreements 
																																								 																				
68 Department of International Trade of the UK, ‘Impact assessment for the EU-SADC Economic Partnership 
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69 Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union  and the Southern African Development 
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http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-partnership-strategy-en.pdf accessed 10 March 2020. 
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Morning Post (31 July 2019) https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3020840/avocado-strategy-
how-africa-aims-rebalance-trade-china accessed 10 March 2020. This comment is supported by the findings 
from Marino. Similarly, he observes that ‘the bilateral  trade between South Africa and China is primarily 
Chinese imports to South Africa of a variety of labour intensive manufactured goods, while South Africa’s 
exports to China are largely processed raw materials’. See Rich Marino, The Future BRICS: A Synergistic 
Economic Alliance or Business as Usual? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 163. 
75 Nyabiage (2019), supra note 74. 
76 Ian Taylor, ‘China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa’, International Affairs, 2006, 82(5): 937-959, p. 943. 
77 CEIC, ‘View China's Oil Consumption from 1965 to 2018 in the Chart’ (2019) 
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/china/oil-consumption accessed 10 March 2020. 
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with states that produce oil, gas, and other resources.78 The strategy chosen is basically to 
acquire foreign energy resources via long-term contracts as well as purchasing overseas assets 
in the energy industry. Africa is a prime site because ‘China confronts foreign competition. 
Chinese companies must go to places for oil where American and European companies are not 
present.’79 In the view of Taylor, two countries, in particular, stand out as examples of where 
Beijing has intimate dealings, but where standards of good governance are woefully inadequate: 
one of which is Angola (the other is Sudan).80 
 
   In relation to Angola, in 2015, China was by far the major destination of exports (43.2 percent) 
from the country. 97.7 percent of all exports from the country were fuels and mining products, 
unlike South Africa above where their major exports were manufactures (47.7 percent).81 The 
case of Angola has reflected well what lies under the core of the strategic partnership between 
China and Africa, that is, Africa’s natural resources. This in fact has been explicitly 
acknowledged by the FOCAC.82 Angola is a member of two trading blocs within Africa, 
namely COMESA and SADC. According to Begu and colleagues, Angola is the second largest 
petroleum exporter to China, just after Saudi Arabia.83 This can be a win-win scenario, in a 
sense that China gets the natural resources they need, and Angola gets the petroleum revenues 
and other forms of investments from China to rebuild the country which was destroyed by civil 
war. Ofodile is surprised that Angola has not concluded a BIT with China and yet is amongst 
the highest recipients of Chinese FDI in the region.84 Begu and colleagues concern that the 
underdevelopment of legal approaches will likely ‘vitiate the long-term sustainability of [trade 
relations between the two countries]’.85 As rightly indicated by Han, BITs are an outcome of 
the evolution of international investment law and can overcome the weakness of domestic law. 
In the absence of BITs, it means foreign investors have to rely on the national rule of law.86  
    
   According to the Legatum Prosperity Index 2018, although it generally finds that Sub-
Saharan Africa is progressing, gaining particularly in the business environment, governance 
and social capital, certain African countries like Angola may not be regarded very highly in 
terms of their business environment (see Table 2).87 Likewise, the World Bank has presented 
an essentially similar view in its Doing Business Report 2019 (see also Table 2). All these 
points to the conclusion that the regulatory environment in certain African countries may not 
be very conducive to business activities. For example, Angola is particularly performing poorly 
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79 Ibid.  
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in the aspect of enforcing contracts in the World Bank report (ranking 186th out of 190 
countries). 
  
Table 2 – Business Environment of Selected African Countries 
 
 South Africa Angola Djibouti Kenya 
Legatum 
Institute  
(Out of 149 
Countries) 
53th 146th 138th 48th 
World Bank 
(Out of 190 
Countries 
82th 173th 99th 61th 
 Data Source: Legatum Institute and World Bank  
   The suboptimal legal environment may prove to be a problem for Chinese entities operating 
in Africa, as evidenced by reportedly the first court case related to BRI.88 DP World, based in 
Dubai, one of the world’s top port operators, sued China Merchants Port, a subsidiary of state 
enterprise China Merchants Group, over the cancellation of a long-term contract that DP World 
had been granted to run a container terminal in Djibouti exclusively. It is alleged that Djibouti’s 
government nationalised the container terminal in 2017, cancelled the contract and brought in 
China Merchants in return for investment and state financing. An arbitration court in London 
had ruled in favour of DP World that the company is the legal owner of the terminal 
concession.89 Hence the company then took the case to Hong Kong’s High Court with a view 
to enforcing the arbitral ruling.90 This case has certainly demonstrated the legal uncertainties 
surrounding operating in Africa.  
 
   As reported by the South China Morning Post, a surge in investment in big infrastructure 
projects that started in 2015, most of it financed by loans from state-backed financial 
institutions from China, has been a significant driver of economic growth in Djibouti.91 Export-
Import Bank of China, one of three institutional banks in China charged with implementing the 
state policies and not subject to Beijing’s recent capital control restrictions, is major investor 
in at least eight infrastructure projects, including an ongoing US$322 million water pipeline 
project from Ethiopia, the US$490 million Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway, which was launched 
in January, and a new, US$450 million international airport in Bicidley. However, at the same 
time, the IMF has warned that Djibouti faced a high risk of debt distress as the government had 
raised public external debt from 50 percent of gross domestic product at the end of 2014 to 85 
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89 As reported by the Wall Street Journal, the London Court of International Arbitration in January 2020 asked 
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Rejects Court Ruling to Hand Back Container Terminal’ Wall Street Journal (17 January 2020) 
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accessed 10 March 2020. 
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per cent by the end of 2016.92 This concern is consistent with the sceptical view of BRI that it 
is ‘debt-trap diplomacy’.  
 
   As shown above, Djibouti is not a major trading partner of China in Africa, despite being a 
BRI country. Kenya, in contrast, is more important. Djibouti’s Doraleh Container Terminal, 
and Kenya’s port Mombasa, are strategic trading gateway at an ocean-going crossroads 
between Asia and Europe. The flagship BRI project in Kenya is the Mombasa-Nairobi Standard 
Gauge Railway. As reported by the BBC, the Kenyan government expects the new railway line, 
largely financed by Chinese loans to boost GDP by 1.5 percent, meanwhile sceptics were of 
the opinion that the economic benefit of it would be marginal.93 This again echoes the general 
concern of the BRI, as to whether the benefits brought about by the infrastructure projects can 
outweigh the costs. As a BRI country, Kenya’s trade does somewhat rely on China. The country 
mainly exports to the EU and Uganda, although it imports significantly from China (as by far 
the leading importing origin).94  
 
   It has been reported recently that Kenya ranked as Africa’s third most indebted country to 
China for the period between 2000 to 2017.95 As a condition of the initial funding deal, the 
Kenyan government agreed that Chinese lenders could lawfully seize the port of Mombasa if 
the debt were not repaid. This may mirror what happened in Sri Lanka. In July 2017, Sri Lanka 
agreed to lease the Hambantota Port to China Merchant Port for 99 years for US$1.4 billion to 
settle unpaid debts to China.96 The port was built with Chinese money borrowed by Sri Lanka. 
Critics denounce the Chinese move as an erosion of country’s sovereignty.97 Yet some defend 
that Chinese infrastructure loans have not led to the forfeiture of a single valuable asset abroad 
thus far.98 
 
   There is obviously tension in Sino-African trade, which can perhaps be summarised by two 
polarising theses. While critics frequently pose the ‘China threat’ discourse, many 
commentators believe that the world could gain benefits from the rise of China.99 In the view 
of Manero, the bottom line is China’s investments have already begun to change how the West 
approaches development deals, causing a shift from a focus on pure lump aid to new systems 
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like aid for trade, where developing countries receive focused trade capacity and infrastructure 
building assistance.100 For example, Aboubaker Omar Hadi, chairman of the Djibouti Ports and 
Free Zones Authority, has indicated that ‘countries other than China had not invested enough 
in Djibouti’.101 In other words, countries like Djibouti indeed have no choice but to rely on 
Chinese funding for infrastructure development.  
     
    In a nutshell, it is said that there are four distinct archetypes of the Africa-China partnership, 
according to McKinsey and Company.102 South Africa can be regarded as a robust partner, 
where a clear strategic posture toward China is present, along with a high degree of economic 
engagement; Kenya is an example of solid partners, where a comparatively weak level of 
engagement is witnessed, but government relations and Chinese business and investment 
activity are meaningful and growing; Angola is an unbalanced partner, where engagement with 
China has been quite narrowly focused. In Angola’s case, the government has supplied oil to 
China in exchange for Chinese financing and construction of major infrastructure projects, but 
market-driven private investment by Chinese firms has been limited compared with other 





As for the firm level, according to a study by the Chinese government in 2013, other than 
infrastructure and petroleum projects by large SOEs, China’s investments were seen in 
different sectors and sizes.103  From 2009 to 2012, Chinese enterprises’ direct investment 
volume in Africa’s manufacturing sector totalled US$1.33 billion.104 Chinese enterprises have 
invested in finance, trade, science and technology services, power supply and other fields in 
Africa. By the end of 2012, China’s direct investment in Africa’s financial sector reached 
US$3.87 billion, accounting for 17.8 percent of its total investment volume in Africa.105 There 
were also a large number of small and medium-sized Chinese investors engaged in agricultural 
and sideline product processing and petty commodity production in Africa. In 2017, McKinsey 
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and Company estimated that more than 10,000 Chinese firms were operating in Africa, 
spreading across different African countries and sectors of business.106  
 
Further, as observed by the management consulting firm, despite the many diverse African 
sectors in which Chinese firms are investing, within two sectors, manufacturing, and 
construction - real estate, Chinese companies have rapidly achieved a sizeable market share.107 
In manufacturing, it is estimated that Chinese companies already handle 12 percent of Africa’s 
industrial production, valued at some US$500 billion a year in total.108 In construction and real 
estate, Chinese companies’ dominance is even more pronounced, with nearly 50 percent of 
market share.109 However, investment is not always necessarily a success. For example, in 
Angola, Sinopec invested in six deep-water oilfields in co-operation with  Angola’s state oil 
group,  Sonangol,  between  2004  and  2013.  Those oilfields have turned into a  black hole of 
sorts,  swallowing funds from  Sinopec without generating any commercial value.110 Dollar 
attributed the investment failure to poor governance in certain African countries like Angola, 
which has been discussed above.111 
 
   On the other hand, despite relatively immaterial, such an investment flow is not unilateral. 
The southern Chinese city of Guangzhou has the presence of a large number of Africans and 
their small businesses.112	African businesspeople started streaming into Guangzhou after China 
joined the World Trade Organisation in 2001. The growth was so rapid that in the 2000s the 
city’s Xiaobei area became known as ‘Little Africa’.113 In 2009, local media put the city’s 
African population as high as 100,000.114 As regards large companies, SABMiller, a South 
African brewing company, began its expansion into China in the mid-1990s. Today, decades 
after its first investments, SABMiller co-owns more than 90 breweries with China Resources 
Enterprise, producing around 30 beer brands with a 23 percent market share.115 Tunisia’s 
investment in China’s fertiliser production has an even more extended history. Initially 
launched as a key project of China’s Eighth Five-Year Plan, the Sino-Arab Chemical Fertilizers 
Company was a joint initiative reached by Tunisia and China when Tunisia’s late Prime 
Minister Mohammed Mzali visited Beijing in 1984.116 
 
   In addition to economic benefits, it is also expected that China and Chinese companies can 
create wider good for Africa. McKinsey and Company have acknowledged various instances 
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of labour and environmental violations by Chinese companies.117 Furthermore, human rights 
are also at the top of the agenda. One notable episode was the divestment movement of 
PetroChina, a listed company and subsidiary of the state-controlled China National Petroleum 
Corporation owing to the genocide in Darfur, Sudan.118 Companies like PetroChina were 
heavily criticised for having a business relationship with the government and not having taken 
a stand against the genocide. A good corporate governance framework through pressure from 
the markets and other regulatory mechanisms to foster corporate social responsibility may 
ensure that China’s presence in Africa can create wider good.119 
 
   The aforementioned Chinese government study in 2013 notably showcased several examples 
that Chinese companies have done to improve the overall livelihood in Africa, as opposed to 
exploitation and a pure profit-seeking motive.120 For example, while undertaking infrastructure 
projects in Africa, the study indicated that Chinese enterprises had paid attention to localised 
operation and management styles, and taken an active part in programs benefiting local 
people.121 Those that invest in crop cultivation in Zimbabwe have provided interest-free loans 
to local farmer households, improved production infrastructure, offered technical guidance for 
the whole production process, organised local employees to visit China, and funded local 
schools and orphanages. 122  These have promoted the positive interaction and common 
development of Chinese enterprises and local society. Similarly, in Zambia, Chinese 
enterprises have repaired roads, hospitals and houses of some mines, and donated sports 





By looking at the statistics, the importance of China to Africa appears to be more apparent than 
the converse relationship. China is the largest source of trade and a major source of investments 
for Africa. However, conversely, the trade and investment with Africa merely represent a 
fraction of China’s overall activities in this area. On the one hand, China’s appetite for Africa’s 
natural resources is evident. On the other hand, it is quite fair to say Sino-African trade is more 
symbolic to China than material, as somewhat evidenced by the absence of motivation to 
engage in advanced trade discussions/agreements between Africa and African countries. For 
example, South Africa is the largest trading partner of China in Africa, but indeed the country 
is closer to the EU than China. The level of Chinese trade and investment may be expected to 
rise amidst BRI, which has been bringing about an unparalleled level of infrastructure 
development to the contingent. However, BRI itself has attracted various criticisms and has 
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been accused of making participating countries debt-laden. On the other hand, one noteworthy 
recent development is the FTA between China and Mauritius, which may prompt more African 
countries, or even Africa as a bloc given the launch of the AfCFTA, to follow suit. However, 
it is to be greeted with the caveat that FTAs, and likewise BITs, may not necessarily lead to 
increased level of trade and investments. Also, certain African countries may not have provided 
an optimal business environment for Chinese companies. Furthermore, there remains doubt 
whether these companies can uphold their social responsibility (as required by law) and help 
to create a better Africa.  
